A LETTER ABOUT *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*:

Written to the DUKE of *NEWCASTLE*, By THOMAS HOBBES of *Malmesbury*:

With OBSERVATIONS upon it,

By a Learned Prelate of the *Church* of *England* lately deceaſed. [Benjamin Laney, Bp. of Ely]

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Mr. HOBBES *his Opinion about* Liberty *and* Neceſſity, *ſent in a Letter to the* DUKE *of* NEWCASTLE.

FIrſt, I conceive, that when it cometh into a man's mind to do, or not to do, ſome certain Action, if he have no time to deliberate the doing of it or abſtaining, neceſſarily followeth the preſent Thought he had of the good or evil Conſequence thereof to himſelf. As, for Example, in ſudden Anger, the Action ſhould

follow the Desire of Revenge; in sudden Fear, the Thought of Escape. Also when a man had time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that should make him doubt of the Consequence, the Action follows his opinion of the Goodness or Harm of it: these Actions I call Voluntary; my *Lord* (if I understand him right) calleth them Spontaneous. I call them Voluntary, because those actions which follow immediately the last Appetite are voluntary; and here where is one onely Appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it's reasonable to punish a rash Action, which could not be justly done by man

man to man, unleſs the ſame were voluntary. For no Actions of man can be ſaid to be without Deliberation, though never ſo ſudden, becauſe it is ſuppoſed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he ſhould do that kind of Action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a ſudden paſſion of Anger, ſhall nevertheleſs be juſtly put to death, becauſe all the time wherein he was able to conſider whether to kill were good or evil, ſhall be held for one continual Deliberation, and conſequently the Killing ſhall proceed from Election.

Secondly, I conceive, when

a man deliberates whether he ſhall do a thing or not do it, that he doth nothing elſe but conſider whether it be better for him to do it or not to do it; and to conſider an Action is to imagine the Conſequences of it both good and evil. From whence it is to be inferred, That Deliberation is nothing elſe but alternate Hope and Fear, or alternate Appetite, to do or quit the Action of which he deliberateth.

Thirdly, I conceive, that in all Deliberations, that is to ſay, in all alternate ſucceſſion of contrary Appetites, the laſt is that which we call the Will, and is immediately before the doing of the Action, or next be-

before the doing of it become impoſſible. All other Appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his Deliberations, are uſually called Intentions, and Inclinations, but not Will, there being but one Will, which alſo in this caſe may be called the Laſt Will, though the Intention change often.

Fourthly, that thoſe Actions which a man is ſaid to do upon Deliberation, are ſaid to be voluntary, and done upon Choice and Election: ſo that voluntary Action, and Action proceeding from Election, is the ſame thing: and that of voluntary Agents, 'tis all one to ſay, he is free, and to ſay, he

hath made an end of deliberating.

Fifthly, I conceive Liberty to be rightly defined in this manner. "Liberty is the ab-"ſence of all the impediments "to Action, that are not con-"tained in the natural and in-"trinſecal quality of the A-"gent. As, for Example, the Water is to be ſeen deſcend freely, or to have liberty to aſcend up the channel of the River, becauſe there is no impediment; and though the Water cannot aſcend, yet men ſay it never wants the liberty to aſcend, but the power or faculty, becauſe the impediment is in the nature of the Water, and intrinſecal. So alſo we ſay,

ſay, He that is tyed, wants liberty to go, becauſe that the impediment is not in him, but in his Bonds; whereas we ſay not ſo of him that is ſick or lame, becauſe the impediment is in himſelf.

Sixthly, I conceive, that nothing taketh beginning from it ſelf, but from the action of ſome other immediate Agent without it ſelf; and that therefore when firſt a man hath an Appetite or Will to ſomething, to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will, the cauſe of his Will is not the Will it ſelf, but ſomething elſe not in his own diſpoſing. So that whereas it is out of controverſy, of voluntary Actions

the Will is a neceſſary cauſe, and by this which is ſaid the Will is alſo cauſed by other things which it diſpoſeth not; it followeth, that voluntary Actions have all their neceſſary cauſes, and therefore are neceſſitated.

Seventhly, I hold That to be a ſufficient Cauſe, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the Effect: the ſame alſo is a neceſſary Cauſe. For if it be poſſible that a ſufficient Cauſe ſhall not bring forth the Effect, then there wanteth ſomewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and ſo the Cauſe was not ſufficient: but if it be impoſſible that a ſufficient Cauſe ſhould

ſhould not produce the effect, then is a ſufficient cauſe a neceſſary cauſe. For it is ſaid to produce an effect neceſſarily, that cannot but produce it. Hence is manifeſt, that whatſoever is produced, hath had a ſufficient cauſe to produce it, elſe it had not been. And therefore alſo Voluntary Actions are neceſſitated.

Laſtly, I hold that the ordinary definition of a Free Agent, namely, That a Free Agent is that which, when all things are preſent which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheleſs not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is Nonſenſe; being as much as to ſay, the Cauſe may be ſufficient.

cient, that is, neceſſary, and yet the Effect not follow. My Reaſons

For the firſt 5 points, where it is explicated. 1. What Spontaneity is. 2. What Deliberation is. 3. What Will, Propenſion, and Appetite, is. 4. What a Free Agent is. 5. What Liberty is. There can be no other proof offered, but every mans own Experience by reflection on himſelf, and remembring what he uſeth to have in his mind, that is, what he himſelf meaneth when he ſaith, an Action is Spontaneous, a man Deliberates, ſuch is his Will, that Agent or Action is Free. Now he that ſo reflecteth upon himſelf, cannot but

but be ſatisfied that Deliberation is the conſidering of the good and evil Sequels of the Action to come: that by Spontaneity is meant Inconſiderate Proceedings, or elſe nothing is meant by it: that Will is the laſt act of our Deliberation: that a Free Agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will: and that Liberty is the Abſence of External Impediments. But to thoſe that out of cuſtom ſpeak not what they conceive, but what they hear; and are not able, or will not take the pains to conſider what they think, when they hear ſuch words, no argument can be ſufficient, becauſe Experience and Matter of Fact is not ve-

verified by other mens Arguments, but by every mans own Sense and Memory. For example, how can it be proved that to love a thing, and to think it good, is all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that Eternity is not *Nunc stans* to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive it himself in his mind? Also the 6th. point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a Cause, can no other way be made known, but by crying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no Cause

Cauſe of the thing) to conceive it ſhould begin at one time as an other; that is, he hath equal reaſon to think it ſhould begin at all times, which is impoſſible; and therefore he muſt think there was ſome ſpecial Cauſe why it began then, rather than ſooner or later, or elſe that it began never, but was Eternal.

For the 7th. point, that all Events have neceſſary Cauſes, it is there proved in that they have ſufficient Cauſes. Further, let us alſo in this place ſuppoſe any Event never ſo caſual, as the throwing (for example) *Ambs-ace* upon a Pair of Dice, and ſee if it muſt not have been neceſſary before it was

was thrown; for seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient Cause to produce it, consisting partly in the Dice, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the Hand, the measure of Force applied by the Caster, the posture of the parts of the Table, and the like. In summe, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular Cast, and consequently that Cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the Cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be pro-

proved, that every other Accident, how contingent ſoever it be, is produced neceſſarily; which is that that my L. Biſhop diſputes againſt. The ſame alſo may be proved in this manner: Let the caſe be put (for example) of the Weather; 'tis neceſſary that to morrow it ſhall rain, or not rain; if therefore it be not neceſſary it ſhall rain, it is neceſſary it ſhall not rain; otherwiſe there is no neceſſity that the Propoſition [It ſhall rain or not rain] ſhould be true. I know there be ſome that ſay, it may neceſſarily be true, that one of the two ſhall come to paſs, but not ſingly that it ſhall rain; which is as much as to ſay,

one

one of them is neceſſary, yet neither of them is neceſſary; and to ſeem to avoid that abſurdity, they make a diſtinction, that neither of them is true *determinatè*, but *indeterminatè*: which diſtinction either ſignifies no more but this, *One of them is true but we know not which*, and ſo the Neceſſity remains though we know it not; or if the meaning of the diſtinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have ſaid, One of them is true *Tytiricè*, but neither of them *Tupatulicè*.

The laſt thing, in which alſo conſiſteth the whole controverſie, namely, that there is no ſuch thing as an Agent

which

which when all things neceſſary to Action are preſent, can nevertheleſs forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no ſuch thing as Freedom from Neceſſity, is eaſily inferred from that which hath been before alledged; for if it be an Agent, it can work, and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requiſite to produce the Action, and conſequently the Cauſe of the Action is ſufficient, and if ſufficient, then alſo neceſſary, as hath been proved before.

And thus you ſee how the inconveniences, which his Lordſhip (Biſhop *Bramhal*) objecteth, muſt follow upon the holding of Neceſſity, are avoided

voided, and the Neceſſity it ſelf demonſtratively proved. To which I could adde, if I thought it good Logick, the inconvenience of denying Neceſſity; as that it deſtroyeth both the Decrees and the Preſcience of God Almighty: for whatſoever God hath purpoſed to bring to paſs by Man as an Inſtrument, or foreſeeth ſhall come to paſs, a man, if he have Liberty, (ſuch as his Lordſhip affirmeth) from Neceſſitation, might fruſtrate, and make not to come to paſs; and God ſhould either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he ſhould foreknow ſuch things ſhould be as ſhall never be, and decree that which

ſhall

ſhall never come to paſs.

This is all that hath come into my mind touching this queſtion ſince I laſt conſidered it, and I humbly beſeech your Lordſhip to communicate it onely to my Lord Biſhop: and ſo praying God to proſper Your Lordſhip in all Your Deſigns, I take leave, and am (my moſt Noble and moſt Obliging *Lord*)

Your moſt Humble Servant,

Rouen, Aug. 20. 1645.

THO: HOBBS.

The POSTSCRIPT.

ARguments ſeldom work on men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themſelves in a contrary Opinion; if any thing do it, it is the ſhewing them the Cauſe of their Errour, which is this. Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for Honours ſake, whatſoever they ſee is Honourable in the world, as Seeing, Hearing, Willing, Knowing, Juſtice, Wiſdom, &c. but deny him ſuch poor things as Eyes, Ears, Brains, and other Organs, without which we Worms neither have nor can conceive ſuch Faculties to be, and ſo far they do well. But when they

they dispute of Gods Actions Philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such Faculties, and in that manner as we have them, this is not well; and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's Nature, he is no fit subject for our Philosophy. True Religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants, and in giving God such Honour both in Attributes and Actions, as they in their several Lieutenancies shall ordain.

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OBSERVATIONS

Upon A

LETTER

Of

Mr. *T. Hobbs* to the Duke of *NEWCASTLE*,

Which he calls His Opinion about *Liberty* and *Neceſſity.*

THE Deſign of the Letter, or (as he himſelf ſpeaks in one part of it) that in which the whole Contro-

verſie conſiſts, is, That Voluntary Agents do always act neceſſarily, or (which is all one) act without liberty, that is, from neceſſity. And this Opinion of his is firſt ſet down in 8 Points, and then (as the Title of the next Part imports) ſo many Reaſons to thoſe Points. The firſt Point is, That *by Spontaneity is meant Inconſiderate Proceeding, &c. without Deliberation.*

I call this the firſt Point, not becauſe I find Spontaneity deſcribed here, but becauſe at the entrance of his Reaſons he declares that to be his deſign. It's true that he ſaith, ſomewhat of the Biſhops Opinion concerning it, but very doubtfully,

fully, as he had cauſe; for he ſhall not find among any that maintain the difference between Spontaneous and Voluntary Actions, that Spontaneity conſiſts in Inconſiderateneſs or Indeliberation, as he would have it, when he ſays it muſt mean that or nothing. Whereas indeed his Adverſaries would be as well content it ſhould mean nothing as that. For Inconſideration is the privation and want of conſidering where it ſhould and ought to have been, (*i. e.*) in Agents of Reaſon and Will; for we do not ſay that Natural Agents, that have no Reaſon and Will, do act inconſiderately. For when the Water

doth *ſponte fluere*, and the Fire *calefacere*, we cannot ſay they do it inconſiderately, or for want of that Deliberation, of which they are not capable; for you might as well ſay, they act ſo for want of Reaſon: and if want of Reaſon and Deliberation makes an Action ſpontaneous, then all violent Actions would be ſpontaneous, for they alſo want Reaſon in all natural Agents, as that the Water aſcends for want of Reaſon and Deliberation.

And therefore the next time Mr. *Hobbs* means to play the Philoſopher about Neceſſity and Liberty, I ſhall adviſe him to take better notice of the nature and difference between Spon-

Spontaneous and Voluntary Actions. Men call those Voluntary Actions, as the word it self imports, that proceed from the Will, (*i.e.*) voluntary Agents; and those Spontaneous, that proceed from the fixt unchangeable nature of (*i.e.*) from natural Agents. If Mr. *Hobbs* knew not this difference, let him learn't against another time; if he did know it, it had been the part of a good Philosopher to have took notice of it, and when he would prove that Spontaneous and Voluntary are all one, to make instance in such Actions as are in that more appropriate and special sence called Spontaneous; such as I nam'd before,

the Water's flowing, and the Fire's heating, and make it appear that they are also Voluntary, that is, do follow the last Will of the Water and Fire, (for so, Voluntary, is defined.) Now if no man in his right wits will either say that these are Voluntary, or gainsay their being Spontaneous, (*i.e.*) that they do *sponte agere*; it must of necessity follow, first, That there is a manifest difference between those sorts of Actions; and secondly, That it is necessary that those things which differ, for more distinct knowledge, should have given them also different Appellations; and thirdly, That none are of themselves more apt, though

though they may ſometimes be uſed promiſcuouſly, than thoſe of Voluntary and Spontaneous.

But for ſo much as I have already taken notice of in the firſt Point, whether he be miſtaken in the Biſhop, or I in him, it makes not much either for or againſt the principal queſtion of Liberty; for I find no mention of Spontaneity afterwards, that there need any enquiry of the nature and definition of it.

But for voluntary Actions, becauſe we have often uſe of them in the following Diſcourſe, it will be better worth the labour to examine what they are defined to be.

Thoſe Actions that follow immediately the laſt Appetite are Voluntary.

I ſhould acknowledge this Definition, if the word [laſt] did not corrupt it, which makes it either falſe or frivolous. For if he ſuppoſes it to be the laſt Will before it be followed, it is falſe, for it becomes rather the Laſt by being followed; or if that Will be ſuppoſed to be followed becauſe it is laſt, it is alſo falſe; for the Action follows the Will becauſe it is the Will, not becauſe it is the laſt Will: for the Will is laſt becauſe it is followed, not followed becauſe it is laſt. It's not Firſt or Laſt that makes a thing willed, but becauſe

cauſe it is good, or ſeems ſo. Or if there be a ſence in which it is not falſe, it is yet frivolous. As if a man ſhould ſay out of a deep contemplation and obſervation of Nature, "No man "dyed ever of any Diſeaſe "but the laſt he was ſick of. "No man ever drank a whole "Glaſs of Wine but the laſt "when he drank it. If the word [laſt] carries no force in it, either to make the Diſeaſe more malignant, or the Wine more pleaſant; ſuch Speculations, though they have a truth in them, will go for no better than ridiculous: ſo [laſt] which adds nothing to the Will, might have been left out in the Definition. And yet I

am content it ſhould ſtand there ſtill, untill you ſee more cauſe to remove it, as perhaps you may when we come to the third point; for there we are promiſed to hear more of the ſame matter, a point ſet apart of purpoſe to ſhew the nature of the Will and Inclinations.

Second Point is the Definition of Deliberation. *Deliberation is nothing but Alternate Hope and Fear, or Alternate Appetite to doon quit the Action.*

It's a ſtrange impropriety of Speech, 1. to ſay that Deliberation, which is an act of the Underſtanding, ſhould be either Fear or Hope, which be affections; ſuch a confus'd tumbling together of the Faculties

culties of the Soul becomes onely him, that either underſtands not, or deſires not to be underſtood. But perhaps his meaning may be, that the Underſtanding in Deliberation repreſents one-while matter of Fear, otherwhile of Hope. This, I confeſs, is true, and that this Hope or Fear doth not always produce ſuch a reſolution and act of the Will, upon which the Action follows; but yet produces a true and perfect reſolution, or act of the Will. For it is not poſſible for a man to have true cauſe and matter of Hope repreſented to him, but he muſt will it, at leaſt in a degree, and ſo long as that Hope is not impeach'd

peach'd by a new Deliberation. So it is alike in Fear, that whoſoever actually fears any evil, effectually wills the avoiding of it, till ſomething intervenes that diverts the Fear. But of this more in the next Point.

Third Point. The Will is defined to be the *laſt Appetite, and is immediately before the doing of the Action.* Other Appetites that come upon men in time of Deliberation are but intentions and inclinations. The truth of theſe and the like Points (ſaith Mr. *Hobbs*) is to be tried by reflection upon our ſelves, what we conceive when ſuch Speeches are us'd: and then the Will is nothing

elſe

elſe but the laſt Appetite. Methinks Mr. *Hobbs* ſhould have heard of *Voluntas ambulatoria*, a Will liable to change; and therefore every Will is not the laſt. For if you reflect, you ſhall find a man ſeriouſly to will and reſolve that to day, which the next day he wills not. When a man makes his Teſtament, which is alſo call'd his laſt Will, and is indeed of all others the moſt reſolv'd act of his Will; yet he may change that Will, and often men do it. But then you ſay it ceaſeth to be his laſt Will. 'Tis true. And therefore ſomething was a Will for the time, which was not the laſt Appetite. But it cannot now be call'd his Will. True, be-

becauſe he has chang'd it, not becauſe it is not laſt; for herein (ſay we) conſiſts the liberty of a voluntary Agent, that he can change his Will, and make that not to be laſt which once was laſt, that is, he hath power over his laſt Will, I mean over that which for the time was the laſt, and was as ſerious and reſoly'd as the laſt.

And for thoſe Actions which he calls only Intentions and Inclinations, I ſee no reaſon why they ſhould not be called Wills; ſeeing 1. they are acts of the Will, for no application of the Soul to any thing, upon a reaſon can proceed from the inferiour, Senſitive part, and therefore muſt either be acts of

of the Will, or be nothing at all. And 2ly. by Mr. *Hobbe's* own rule and definition of Will, every one of thoſe ſucceſſive Appetites are Wills, becauſe 'till another conſequent Appetite followed, they were the laſt for the time, and therefore in their courſes and turns all are Wills. Indeed after they are changed and unwilled again, I think no man deſires they ſhould be ſtill called Wills, when they ceaſe to be at all.

Fourth Point. *To ſay he is a free Agent, is all one to ſay, He hath made an end of Deliberation.*

Here I ſhall call Mr. *Hobbs* again to his own reflection, whe-

whether a man cannot be ſaid to be free, before he hath made an end of Deliberation, rather than after? As when I deſire to have a friend dine with me, I meaning to ask him firſt whether he be ingaged, or reſolv'd for any other company, do uſe theſe words; *Sir, are you free?* and if he anſwers me that he is free, I preſently apprehend, that he is not reſolv'd for any particular, but is ſtill capable of a reſolution to dine with me. Not, but that he may be ſaid to be free too that hath made an end of Deliberation, but in another ſence; that is, he is free from all doubts that come by Deliberation. But the ſame may be

be free alſo before Deliberation is ended, but it is from particular determinations and reſolutions, which is the freedom we defend, to do or not to do. And this ſeems to be a greater and more proper Freedom than the other; for he that is free from Deliberation, acts indeed freely, but it is in that one way to which he is reſolved. But he that is ſo free as to go any way, is more free than he that goes but freely in one way.

Fifth Point. *Liberty is the abſence of all Impediments to Action, that are not contained in the nature and intrinſecal qualities of the Agent.*

If it will content Mr. *Hobbs*, That

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If it will content Mr. *Hobbs*, That

That ſhall be allow'd to be one ſence of the word: but if I may have leave to do but what he deſires I ſhould do, reflect, I find another ſence, and the very ſame which is denied by him, A Liberty from Neceſſity. As when a Father recommends a Wife to his Son, the Son hath, no doubt, liberty to take that Wife in Mr. *Hobbs* his ſence. And yet if the ſame Son ſhould deſire his Father to give him his liberty, the Father would preſently apprehend, that he deſired ſomewhat that he had not given him, that is, leave as well to refuſe her if he ſaw cauſe, as to take her; he would not cavil with him, and ſay, You have the liberty

berty in that you are ty'd to her: but if he means to give him his liberty, his meaning alſo will be to abſolve him of the neceſſity to take her. By this we ſee, that no advantage is gotten to Mr. *Hobbs* by reflection, which ſhews a Liberty from Neceſſity reflected alſo.

Sixth Point is an argument to prove, That *all Actions are neceſſitated, becauſe they have neceſſary Cauſes.*

I deny the Conſequence. For when he ſayes, That all Actions have their neceſſary Cauſes, his meaning is (if his meaning agree with the reaſon he gives of it,) That it is neceſſary they have Cauſes, *becauſe*

cauſe (ſaith he) *nothing can have beginning from it ſelf.* Now can any one imagine, that a reflecting man ſhould think this a good conſequence? Nothing can have beginning from it ſelf, and therefore every thing is neceſſitated: that becauſe an Effect muſt neceſſarily be produced by ſome Cauſe, that therefore the Cauſe did neceſſarily produce that Effect. For, good Sir, reflect again, and bethink your ſelf, That as ſome Effects cannot be produced but by a concurrence of many Cauſes together, every one of theſe is neceſſary to the producing of the Effect, and yet not any one of theſe doth neceſſitate the Effect; but rather

ther it is neceſſary that nothing ſhould be effected, if that cauſe be ſingle and alone.

Seventh Point is another argument to prove, That *voluntary actions are neceſſitated, becauſe they have ſufficient Cauſes, and all ſufficient Cauſes are neceſſary.*

That all ſufficient Cauſes are neceſſary, [ſufficient] may have a double meaning: either when there is ſufficient virtue and aptneſs in the things to produce the Effect, if they were us'd and imployed by the Agent; or elſe when the Agent alſo actually imployes them to that purpoſe till the work be produc'd.

Take

Take [ſufficient] in this latter ſence, and all men will confeſs, that the Effect will follow neceſſarily. But the Power, which the Will is ſaid to have over ſufficient Cauſes, is underſtood of ſuch onely as are ſufficient in the firſt ſence, (*i. e.*) ſuch as have aptneſs in them to produce the Effect, when they are uſed; which is a ſence both common and reaſonable: As I have ſufficient to pay all my Debts, I have ſufficient to defray the charges of a years travel; and yet neither pay a Penny, nor ſtir a foot.

Eighth Point, charges the Definition of a Free Agent that is given by others, with *Nonſenſe* and *Contradiction*; *viz.*

viz. That *when all things needful to produce the Effect be present, can nevertheless not produce it.*

For the Nonsense let it lie between us a while, till the matter be examined a little, and then let them take it that have most right to it. If there be any Nonsense in the Definition, it must be either in the meaning of them that use it, or in the words they use to express their meaning. When they speak of all things needful to produce the Effect, their meaning is well known to be of all except the Agent's Will: or if it were not known to Mr. *Hobbs*, it might and ought to have been from the very

very words of the Definition, which plainly suppose the Will of the Agent to be yet undetermined. All things needful in this sense may well be, and yet nothing produc'd, because the Agent hath not yet resolv'd to use them. But if Mr. *Hobbs* will make them mean what they do not, he may very well make them speak what they should not. Now if their meaning imply no Contradiction or Nonsense, as certainly it doth not, then of necessity the words must, or it will not be difficult on whom to bestow the Nonsense. And for the words, (to say there be all things needful, when yet the Agent is excepted, who

is

is no leſs needful than any of the reſt,) let the common language of men, or as Mr. *Hobbs* is pleaſed to call it, let Reflexion be judge. As when a man hath a good ſeat for a Houſe, all materials, workmen, and mony to defray the charges, he may, and commonly doth uſe to ſay, He hath all things requiſite and needful to build a Houſe, and then too when his Will is yet ſuſpended, and unreſolved whether to uſe them or not. Therefore your Self, or, if you will, Reflexion being judge, you have clapt the Nonſenſe upon your own head.

But enough of the Points, let us ſee if we can mend

our ſelves with the Reaſons of them.

REASONS.

Wipe your Eyes, I beſeech you, for never were there ſuch Reaſons ſeen before, ſuch Myſteries diſcovered.

For the firſt Point, yea for five of the eight Points, the Reaſons are, That they have no Reaſons. For he ſayes they cannot be prov'd but by Reflexion: and in that he ſpeaks but truth; for 'tis ſure, no reaſon or proof can be made of the ſignification and uſe of Words, which is all that the firſt five Points have bleſt us with. But though he ſaid true, in ſaying no Reaſons could

could be given; yet he ſaid not well in promiſing Reaſons, when he puts us off with Reflexions. Of the five firſt points himſelf confeſſes that no Reaſons can be given; and of the two next, if he will not confeſs ſo too, he ſhall be compelled. For they are Arguments, and contain in effect and ſubſtance Syllogiſms, which are incapable of Reaſons; for who ever went about to give, or could give Reaſon of a whole Syllogiſm, if the Reaſons preſented belong to any part of the Syllogiſm, in which caſe only Reaſons can be given? Let him but ſay to which part of his Points his Reaſon belongs, and I will do him ſo much reaſon

as to acknowledge it. In the mean time he ſtands upon his good Behaviour, whether theſe two points ſhall be allowed to have any more reaſon than the five former. And for the eighth and laſt point, which is all the hope that is left us to be a point of reaſon, his Reaſon is, That as he ſaid before, ſo now he ſayes again; and whatſoever Mr. *Hobbs* is pleaſed to ſay twice over, you may be aſſur'd is true.

This is the ſumme of his Reaſons, in the moſt ſober and favourable conſtruction I can make of them; yet becauſe under the title of the ſeventh Reaſon, ſome new matter is alledg'd, that was not ſpoken of

of before, I ſhall ſay ſomething to that too.

He layes down a Propoſition more general than the queſtion, That *all Events never ſo caſual have neceſſary Cauſes.*

If I ſhould grant this, yet the voluntary Agent may be free, though the work which he produces be neceſſary. This I ſhall ſhew in the Inſtances which are brought to prove this Propoſition.

The firſt is of the Chance of a Die. I confeſs, that though it be very caſual to the Caſter, yet it doth neceſſarily come to paſs upon ſuch poſtures and motions of the Hand and Die, as happen'd to meet together

at that time: yet I say too, that as to the Caster of the Die it was not necessary, because he had a double power over that Chance to have hinder'd it if he pleas'd; for either he might not have thrown the Dice at all, or he might have so ordered the motion and posture of his hand that could have caused another Chance. Yea more (desiring to avoid controversies, as much as Mr. *Hobbs* doth to make them) I grant also, that there is a time when, and a respect wherein voluntary Agents are in the same condition with natural, and do act necessarily. For not onely a natural Agent solely and singly doth work his proper na-

natural Effect neceſſarily, as the Fire neceſſarily heats; but alſo when they are in conjunction together, as it were a corporation of Cauſes: whether that be caſual, as the motions and poſture of the hand, meeting with ſuitable poſtures with the Die and the Table, do produce neceſſarily a certain chance; or whether it be artificial, as the Medicine compounded of ſeveral Drugs do neceſſarily produce a common Effect, beyond the vertue of their particular natures apart, which belongs to them onely in that conjunction and ſociety of operation. So likewiſe a voluntary Agent, conſtantly reſolv'd, and actually coope-

rating with other ſufficient cauſes, doth as neceſſarily produce the Effect, as any natural Agent, working either alone, or in conjunction and ſociety. So as in this caſe, if Mr. *Hobbs* ſeeks for an Adverſary, I aſſure my ſelf he will find none; and if he thinks he hath found a Truth, 'tis but ſuch as was never loſt. But when we affirm voluntary Agents to be free from neceſſity in acting, we look upon them in another ſtate and condition; for they act not like natural Agents, whoſe work immediately follows and flows from their Being, but have a progreſſive operation, that is before any thing: beſide their Being, they de-

deliberate, resolve, and fall to execution, and there is a time for all these allow'd. And though when they are come to that perfect state and progress, that they have pass'd the irrevocable resolv'd Will, they act as necessarily as natural Agents do: yet in their imperfect state, that is, from their first Deliberation to their last constant Resolution, they are absolutely free to do, or not to do. In which case alone we assert the liberty of voluntary Agents, against which nothing either is or can be prov'd by the instance of the chance of a Die.

2. And for the other instance of the Weather, That

whatſoever comes to paſs, *rain*, or *not rain*, it comes ſo to paſs neceſſarily.

I anſwer, firſt, that this is impertinent to the queſtion, concerning the liberty of voluntary Agents, who have no operation or concurrence to the event of Weather.

And ſecondly, the reaſon that is us'd to prove that neceſſary, is inſufficient in many reſpects: as becauſe it is neceſſary that one of the two muſt happen, either *rain* or *no rain*, therefore that which doth happen, comes to paſs neceſſarily. My firſt reaſon is, becauſe the truth of a Disjunctive Propoſition, as this is, [it muſt rain, or not rain,] conſiſts *in disjun-*

ctione

tione partium, and not *in disjunctis partibus*; for when you resolve this Proposition into two Categoricks, [it shall rain] for one, and [it shall not rain] for another, which resolution the event will make, as the nature, so the truth of the Proposition is changed. For when the Event hath turned the Disjunctive Proposition into a Categorick, as that [it rains,] it cannot partake of that Necessity, which consisted onely in the Disjunctive. And to make this plain, I shall quit your Instance with another. Suppose I am confin'd to live within the walls of *London*, so as it is now necessary for me either to live in *Cheap-side*, or

in

in some other part of the City; yet am I not ty'd, by that confinement to *London*, to any one place: if I were ty'd and necessitated to any one place, it must be either to that place I chuse to live in, or to that I do not live in. The latter I hope no man will imagine can be necessary, to live where I do not; and if the former were necessary, that is, to live where I do, *viz.* (for Example) in *Cheap-side*, then by vertue of that confinement to *London*, I might be punish'd if I had not liv'd in *Cheap-side*; in which case a Jury out of *Bethlem* would not condemn me, for that were to make it all one to be necessitated to live in *London*,

don, and to be neceſſitated to live in *Cheap-ſide*. And the reaſon why from the neceſſity of the Diſjunction cannot be inferr'd a neceſſity to the parts of it ſeparately, is clear by the Inſtance I have given. The neceſſity that is laid upon me is to the whole latitude and compaſs of *London*, which leaves me free to any part within that latitude. So the neceſſity that it ſhall *rain or not rain*, is onely to the compaſs and latitude that theſe two make, *raining or not raining*; but within that latitude as to the one alone, or to the other, thereis no neceſſity. If you ſay it is neceſſary for me to live in *Cheap-ſide*, becauſe I live in no

other part of the City; so that it is necessary it should rain, because it doth not hold up: I answer, that this is a necessity of Consequence, which infers no necessity upon the Consequent, which is the Necessity in question; that is, that my living in *Cheap-side*, or the raining to morrow, which are the Consequents, did come to pass by necessary Causes. And because I am afraid of Mr. *Hobbs* his bitter *Sarcasm* upon Distinctions, that to say, It is necessary *necessitate consequentiæ*, but not *consequentis*, is all one to say, It is necessary *Tityre*, but not necessary *tu patulæ*; I will prevent it, by shewing the difference in an instance. If

Mr.

Mr. *Hobbs* would not have the Goose go bare-foot, it is necessary he should shoo it; this no doubt but is a necessary consequence, and yet I suppose he will not think that the consequent is necessary: as that it is necessary he should shoo the Goose; and, to say truth, there is no more necessity it should rain to morrow, than there is to shoo a Goose.

3. In this instance of the Weather there is another impertinency about Necessity: for whereas the question is, Whether all things come to pass necessarily? that is, out of such necessary Causes, that it was not possible they should not come to pass; the proof of this

is

is taken from ſuch a neceſſity as belongs onely to Propoſitions, not to Productions. Which neceſſity of Propoſitions conſiſts onely in a neceſſary coherence of the parts together, ſo as the Enunciation is never falſe: as when the *Genus* is predicated of the *Species*, or the proper Accident of the Subject; as, *Homo eſt Animal, & Homo eſt viſibilis*, are Propoſitions neceſſarily true, becauſe they are alwayes true, and nothing can happen that ſhould make them falſe. So it is neceſſary, that it ſhould rain or not rain to morrow, that is, it is a Propoſition neceſſarily true, and cannot but be true; but no intimation of the Neceſſity in

que-

queſtion, which is the neceſſary production of theſe Events from neceſſary Cauſes. For if this Neceſſity were implyed in that Disjunction, then every neceſſary Propoſition ſhould conſiſt of a neceſſary Effect, predicated of ſufficient and neceſſary Cauſes, which every mean Logician knows to be falſe. And therefore, to uſe Mr. *Hobbs* his own words, becauſe he is like to be beſt pleaſed with them, this is all one as to ſay, It is neceſſary *Tityrizé*, *Ergo* it is neceſſary *tupatuſicé*. After he hath given his Proofs, as he thinks, in full weight, like a free Chapman, he caſts in one Argument over and above, taken from God's

De-

Decrees and Prescience.

Because Mr. *Hobbs* himself doth not warrant this to be good Logick, I cannot in civility charge him for it; but if his design be in that caution [if I thought it good Logick] to make us believe, that he made a conscience of keeping these Rules, I am sorry for his ill luck that he chose to do it here: for if he had but dipped his finger blindfold upon any other part of his Discourse, he might with more colour have accused himself than in this. For pray, against what Rule of Logick doth he trespass, that useth what arguments he pleaseth? But so apt is he to mistake in reprehending others, that he cannot

cannot blame himself without an errour: yet for all this, though there be no want of Logick in using this argument, yet there is not much in the argument he uses.

First in general, both for the Decree and Prescience together, they be Divine Actions that proceed from God's Attributes; and the using of such for arguments of truth in other things, Mr. *Hobbs* himself in his Postscript confesseth to be the cause of those many Errours that men fall into: yet had he not the grace to forbear, but falls himself into the same condemnation he decreed to others, as if he would prove his Errour by his Fault. For what

but

but a Fatal Neceſſity could make him to do that which with the ſame breath almoſt he condemns? But to particulars.

Firſt, of the Decree, that it is fruſtrated by Liberty.

1. I anſwer, that to prove Neceſſity from God's Decrees, is to prove *obſcurum per obſcurius:* for of all the points of Divinity, it is confeſſed by all that write of it, That nothing is more obſcure than the nature and efficacy of Divine Decrees. That is one *Elenche* and Fallacy in Logick.

2. Another is, That [Decree] is an equivocal word, and admits of diverſe ſences and conſtructions. As, for inſtance,

God

God decrees to deſtroy ſome City: that it may be either Conditional, as if it repent not; or Abſolute, whether it repent or no. 2. That Abſolute may be either as to the deſtruction of the City onely, and not to the means by which it is to be deſtroyed, or to both. For though God ſhould decree abſolutely to deſtroy the City, yet it is yet free that it be done either by the mutual diſſenſions of the Citizens, or the invaſion of an Enemy; either of which are a ſufficient, neither a neceſſary meanes: Diſſenſion is not neceſſary, becauſe it may be by Invaſion; and Invaſion is not, becauſe it may be by Diſſenſion. 3. It may be

Ab-

Absolute both to the thing and
to the means. As for the pur
pose, that it may be by Diffen
sion among the Citizens, yet
that means may come to effect
it two wayes; either upon
foresight, that they would dif
sent of themselves, or by ano
ther Decree of God that they
should dissent. 4. God may
also decree that two wayes
either by working upon the
Will by a power irresistible, *per*
motionem Physicam, as they cal
it, or *per Moralem*, that is, such
inducements and inclinations
as will *ducere*, not *trahere*, by
either of which wayes God's
Decree may be accomplished.
This variety, partly in the De
crees, partly in the constitu
ons

ns that are made of them, which do all imply a different respect to Liberty, doth make no Argument from general words insufficient to conclude any thing, for *dolus semper versatur in generalibus & æquivocis*. That's another Fallacy in Logick.

3. Seeing Mr. *Hobbs* hides himself from his Adversary in his Thicket of acceptions, it will be necessary to beat every bush for him, and by inductions of the several sorts of Decrees, to shew that Liberty threatens no destruction to any of them, or, to speak more aptly, needs fear none from them. For if they be inconsistent and mutually destructive, it is rather

ther to be said, that the Decree of God should destroy the Liberty of man, than that the Liberty of man should destroy the Decreee of God.

And that God's Decree hath no such operations upon man's Liberty, I shall instance in the most eminent of all his Decrees, in which all the world and their actions are concerned; I mean that of Election and Reprobation, briefly carrying you through the several opinions and perswasions that several men have of them.

1. That Decree, by which men are said to be ordain'd to Salvation as Believers, and to Damnation as dying in impenitence, presuppoſing their Faith

Faith and Impenitence, can have no operation upon those actions that went before, before (I mean) in consideration, though not in time.

2. That Decree which is put in such an order, as makes it antecedent to mens actions, may preserve the liberty of their Wills divers wayes, and by name, *per congruam vocationem*, that is, by fitting them with such opportune and seasonable inducements, as will infallibly determine but not necessitate them.

3. That Decree that lies in a middle way, between the two forenamed, that in Election goes before, in Reprobation follows the actions; ac-

ding to which opinion, for distinction, the Reprobate are called *Præsciti*, because they be looked upon as Sinners before they be reprobated; and the Elect are more peculiarly called *Prædestinati*, because they are elected before, or without consideration of being Believers. This Decree, as to the Reprobates, can have no operation upon their actions, because it follows them. And as to the Elect, though it goes before their faith, yet, as was said before, it leaves it free to follow after.

If Mr. *Hobbs* his Decree be any of these, or some others, (for others there be) let him wink and choose, or let him take

take the most rigid or peremptory of all, that of the *Calvinists*, that damns men before it makes them, and saves them before they have any thing to be saved; which Decree above all others is most like to impose a Necessity upon humane actions; yet here the argument will fail too.

1. Because there be a great many voluntary actions that come not under this Decree, as having no reference to life or death, from the Decrees whereof must that Necessity flow. As for Example, All indifferent actions, which have nothing of Morality, of Virtue, or Vice in them, which we shall never carry to Heaven or Hell with

us. Now those Actions which work nothing towards the accompliſhing of the Decree, can receive no Neceſſity from it: for if there be any Neceſſity from the Decree, upon humane Actions, it is becauſe it cannot be accompliſhed without them.

2. Upon the ſame account, not onely indifferent but many moral Actions are free from the neceſſity of the Decree. For Example, all the good that a Reprobate doth (for no doubt they do many things morally and ſubſtantially good, and abſtain from many Evils,) cannot be neceſſitated by the Decree of Reprobation; for certainly a man may be damned without doing good. In

like manner all the evil that the Elect doth (for who is there that ſins not?) is alſo free from the Neceſſity his Decree can lay upon him; unleſs you will ſay it is neceſſary for him to ſin, that he may be ſaved; for he is under no other Decree, but that unto life and ſalvation.

3. Upon the ſame ſcore I adde further, that the Decree layes no Neceſſity upon any one action a man doth; for not onely Election cannot neceſſitate a man to ſin, and Reprobation cannot neceſſitate a man to do good; but alſo neither doth Election neceſſitate a man to do good, nor Reprobation evil, as to any particular good

or evil: the reason is, because their Decrees may be brought to pass without them. As *Judas*, though he had not betray'd his Master, might have been hanged for some other sin; for certainly Reprobation doth not necessitate a man to kill his Father or Mother, or to commit any other sin by name. So likewise St. *Peter* might have been saved, though he had not at that time when he did, made his confession, that *Christ was the Son of God*, because it had been sufficient to accomplish the Decree of Election to have believed in Christ at any other time: and if no individual action be necessary to the bringing of that

to

to pass which God hath decreed, then whatsoever else may, the Decree cannot make it necessary. Now if the Decree gives no necessity to actions indifferent, nor to good actions on the Reprobate, nor to evil in the Elect, no, nor to any one particular to either of them; what actions are there left, upon which the Decree can have any such operation? Lastly, if the Decree may pass upon men without respect to their well or ill doing, as in the last nam'd Opinion (which of all others is confess'd most likely to necessitate) is supposed, then 'tis evident there can be no Necessity to do well or ill in reference to the Decree,

which hath no reference to well or ill doing. But you will ſay, to do this or that is neceſſary, though not to the Decree it ſelf, yet to the execution of it. And I beſeech you why ſo? for may not a man as juſtly be hang'd without merit, as be condemn'd to be hang'd without it? Howſoever it is ill done to lay that upon the Decree, which belongs to the execution of it, and 'tis worſe if it belongs to neither. But it may be Mr. *Hobbs* has another kind of Decree by himſelf, as he hath many other conceipts. If he hath, it may prove to be of that nature, when he ſhall vouchſafe to let us know it, that I ſhall deny the

the antecedent of his argument, That there is any ſuch Decree; but be it what it will, I ſhall the conſequence, That therefore there is no liberty in humane actions: which I wonder he ſhould let go upon his bare word, when he cannot but know, that thouſands of Authors, which do not agree about the nature of the Decrees, do yet all agree in denying the conſequence.

Secondly, of Preſcience, and argument taken from it.

1. Though it be an improper ſpeech to ſay, that God foreſees any thing, which muſt imply a *prius* and *poſterius* in his actions, things incompatible with Eternity, that is pre-

ſent to all times; yet becauſe we cannot underſtand God's actions but by taking meaſure by our own, and future things are not ſeen by us but foreſeen, I do allow Mr. *Hobbs* to ſay, That thoſe things which are future to us, though not to God, are yet foreſeen by him, provided, that uſe be not made of it, to argue from his foreſight as an act that is paſt, upon which as a Cauſe muſt depend an Effect that muſt follow after it: for God's viſion doth not prevent the thing ſeen, but accompany it; for that's the nature of every act, that it ſuppoſes the object in ſome kind of being, and ſo is meerly accidental to the nature

ture of it, and can lay no ne-
ceſſity upon it. And though
it be hard to comprehend,
how God ſhould now be ſaid
to be preſent with thoſe things
which are yet to come; and
yet on the other ſide it is as
hard to apprehend how it can
be otherwiſe, that God ſhould
be eternal, and yet not preſent
with any part of time, as well
future as paſt. When Mr. *Hobbs*
ſhall teach us, how God can
ſee that which is not to be ſeen,
for that which is future is not,
and therefore is not to be ſeen;
and to ſay they are to be ſeen
in their Cauſes, is liable to the
ſame difficulties, becauſe the
particular Cauſes of the thing
are as well future as the thing

it

it ſelf: that is, if he can ſhew a better way than this, That thoſe things are preſent to God which are future to us, I will let go my hold. In the mean time it ſhall ſerve for my firſt anſwer to the argument from God's Preſcience, That becauſe all viſion ſuppoſes the thing ſeen to be, it is accidentall to it, and cannot neceſſitate it.

2. Admitting foreſight in God as an act paſt, and the thing to follow, it muſt follow in the ſame condition it was foreſeen, (granting me that which I ſhall preſently prove, That God can foreſee contingent things:) That which in the nature of it was contingent,

gent, cannot become neceſſary by being foreſeen, for then he ſhould not ſee as they are. But you will ſay, If God foreſees them, it is neceſſary they ſhould come to paſs; I ſay ſo too, but how? in that quality that God foreſaw them, that is, contingently; for it's as neceſſary, that thoſe things that are produced of contingent Cauſes, ſhould come to paſs, as thoſe that are produced of neceſſary, upon ſuppoſition of God's foreſight: and it is no bull in that ſenſe to ſay, That contingent things are neceſſary. For there is a double Neceſſity, one of Illation and Diſcourſe, an other of Production and Operation. To affirm

affirm the latter of contingent things implies a contradiction, but not so the former; that is, God's Prescience is a necessary argument to prove, because he cannot be mistaken, but not a necessary Cause to produce the Effect, of which onely necessity the question is moved. This argument therefore hath a term too many; there is one Necessity in the Premises, another in the Conclusion, *Præscientia Dei necessariò probat, non necessariò producit.*

3. If Mr. *H.* shall deny that which I promised to prove, That God can foresee contingent Events, because they have no necessary Causes; then he can-

cannot also foresee what shall come to pass or not come to pass, upon the performance or not performance of a condition. But that God can foresee such things, I hope he will not deny; yet because he is a liberal and fierce denyer, I shall put in him mind of one instance. God told *David* that the men of *Keilah* would deliver him into *Saul*'s hand, but with this tacite condition, If he stay'd among them. And for the consequence, I prove it thus: In this prediction and prevision of what the men of *Keilah* would do, there was no necessary Cause, as is plain, for that it did not bring to pass the Effect; for the men of *Keilah*

Keilah did not, though God foresaw it, deliver *David* into *Saul*'s hand.

And if God can foresee what would have been, but what was not, why may he not rather foresee any thing that shall be, though it may not have been, that is, any future contingent? For if the reason why future contingents cannot be seen or foreseen, be, that they have no necessary Causes; then conditional previsions and predictions of such things, as for failance of the condition come not to pass, could not be foreseen also, for that they have no necessary Causes, as appears by the event.

These be all Mr. *Hobbs* his Ar-

Arguments; yet becauſe he hath found another invention, a kind of Lieutenant-Argument, to which we are ever and anon remitted when arguments be out of the way, which he calls *Reflection*, and he may take it ill if it goes away unlooked on, it will be neceſſary to exchange a word or two about it alſo.

OF

OF

REFLECTION.

LET us see how well it deserves to stand in the Muster-roll of his *Militia*, and hath done such Facts for the subduing of those Monstrous Errors of our Ignorant Forefathers, as is pretended, and for which he dresses a particular Discourse. This you will easily perceive both by the Nature of it, and the Effects and Atchievments of it.

1. The Nature of it is (as far as I can guess) to consider what I my self think of that which

which another lays and proves not: that is, I demand of him and would know, whether that be true which he affirms, he bids me, Go look. Now is that a way to teach me Knowledge, to ſend me to my ſelf, that is, to one that is ignorant, to inform me? And this is that *Columbus* of our New World of Philoſophy, *Reflection*. This is that which (by a Digreſſion on purpoſe) is celebrated to Poſterity as an excellent new Engine, that will fetch Truth out of the very bottom of *Democritus* his Pit. And yet perhaps there's more in it, than we are at the firſt ſight able to apprehend, eſpecially being blinded with our

our Old and Hereditary Errors.

2. Therefore he shews to the World two Noble Experiments of the vertue of it, which he hath found in himself; two such Rarities, as could never be found in all the Books and Philosophers that ever you met with. One is, that thinking a thing to be good, and loving it, is all one. The other, that Eternity is not *Nunc stans*. These be the two rare Experiments which (like a prudent Mountebank) he hangs out for the better reputation and vending his *Reflexion*.

I must needs grant, that these be two admirable strange

Ef-

effects of it. For in the first, Reflection makes him see that which is not; and in the second, it makes him not see that which is.

For First, that thinking a thing to be good, and loving it, is all one; who ever saw such a sight before times? who can believe that any thing should make Thinking and Loving all one? For my part I am still in as much doubt as ever I was; for no Reflection can prevail with me before these Reasons.

1. Because they proceed from several Faculties of the Soul; one from the Intellectual, the other from the Effective part. It is not in the power of Re-

Reflection to perſuade me that the ſame Water comes out of two diſtinct Fountains.

2. Becauſe nothing can go before it ſelf; and he that loves any thing becauſe he hath reaſon to think it good, muſt of neceſſity firſt think it to be ſo.

3. If Thinking and Loving were all one, then to think a thing to be evil, and to love it is all one too. For if the Acts themſelves be not all one, the Object that is the Good can not make them ſo. But he will ſay, If a man reflects, i. e. if he mark it, he that doth the one, doth the other too; and they go always together, and

then

hen why not all one?

1. I will tell you why, and find it by Reflection too; hat he that ſpeaks doth always open his Mouth; and yet they are not all one. The Needle alſo and the Thred go ogether, and yet not all one. They that firſt told us of *Hippocentaures*, certain Creatures that are half Men and half Beaſts, I believe found them out by Reflection too. For the *Barbarians*, when they firſt ſaw Men upon the backs of Beaſts ſo near together, thought them to be but one Creature. Juſt ſo, to make Loving and Thinking all one, becauſe he ſees them together, is one of Mr. *Hobbs*'s *Hippocentaures*; for

he

he hath a Herd of them in this little Copse: As that Spontaneous and Voluntary are all one, that Deliberation and Alternate Hope and Fear are all one, that to make an end of Deliberation and to be Free is all one, that Sufficient and Necessary is all one, that to be necessarily of some Cause and to be necessitated is all one. In all these to believe them, or not to believe them, I hope will be all one too.

2. As they are not the same, though they go together; so they cannot be the same, because they go not together. I mean necessarily. For first there may be thinking of a thing good without loving it, a thing

too too well known, that men act contrary to their knowledge;

——Video meliora, proboque;
Deteriora ſequor——

Secondly, there may be a loving of that which they do not think and judge to be good, becauſe Love many times embraces the good that Senſuality offers; which is contrary to that good which ſerious thinking commends. And I make a queſtion, whether every thing that loves, can think alſo and judge. For I know that an Aſs loves Provender; yet I would give ſomewhat to know what he

thinks for all that; which I would not if they were all one. But it may be I may wrong the poor Ass also to say he cannot think; for there be some Philosophers so charitable to Beasts, as to say they can reason and discourse. Well, if I have wrong'd the Ass I will make him amends, and say, that if he can think, he can reflect too; and if he can do that, he may be one of our new Philosophers, that shall find out many Truths that *Aristotle* never knew; and particularly, shall see plainly that which never a Philosopher of them all did see: that to think a thing to be good, and to love it, is all one. For that is the

first

firſt benefit of Reflection, to ſee that which is not.

2. The next is, not to ſee that which is, as that *Nunc ſtans* is nothing, or ſignifies nothing, of Eternity.

If Mr. *Hobbs* his meaning be, that thoſe words do not clearly and fully expreſs what Eternity is, it is ſo vulgar a Truth, as well for all things that be Infinite, as this, and for all words that can be invented by Man, as well as theſe, that he needed not the help of this rare Invention to diſcover it. But if his meaning be, that by thoſe Terms (*Nunc ſtans*) an imperfect knowledge of Eternity (ſuch as Infinite things are capable

of) cannot be known, namely, that which consists in denying and removing such Qualities and Affections from it, as belong to finite things; he is very little beholden to his Reflection if it will not let him see so much; which is all that any man can desire or hope to see of Infinite things.

And that so much may be seen of Eternity by *Nunc stans*, I shall desire him to forbear reflecting upon himself, that is, upon one that deceives him, and reflect upon the meaning of the Terms that use them, when Eternity is said to be [*Nunc*,] it is to remove from it *præteritum & futurum*, *prius & posterius*, which are parts of Time,

Time, that is finite; therefore they ſay that all times are preſent with the Eternal at once. And it is likewiſe called *Nunc ſtans*, to remove from it a Succeſſion or Motion of part after part, which belongs onely to Time, that is finite; for that to which any thing is added muſt needs be finite; though you adde a thouſand thouſand, and and after that ten thouſand times as many more without ſtint, you can never make it *Infinitum* or *Æternum*. And therefore to remove from Eternity theſe finite Conceptions, the Terms of *Nunc ſtans* are not unfitly us'd for that purpoſe: and for more knowledge of Eternity than that, it

was never in any mans purpoſe to uſe them. If your Reflection would not let you ſee this, I am afraid that though it make you quick at ſeeing ſome things, that no body elſe can ſee; yet in that otherwhile it takes away from you the ſight of that which every body ſees; I am afraid (I ſay) it is not good for the eye-ſight. I conclude therefore, (without thinking of any other revenge for the Nonſenſe, and Contradiction, and the *Tityres* and *Tu patulæs*, and ſuch gear as Mr. *Hobbs* is pleaſed to daub all thoſe with that are not of his mind) with this good counſel, that he give over his Reflection in time, leſt inſtead

ſtead of teaching him ſome new tricks in Philoſophy, it make him at laſt play at *Old blind*, &c.

I ſhould here make an end, but that I ſee Paper enough left, and leiſure too to anſwer an Objection that I may ſeem lyable to: as, What do I ſneaking into a Private Letter, which Mr. *Hobbs* wrote to his Obliging Lord? Who beſides is ſaid, not to write Philoſophy for thoſe that like it not; and therefore I ought not to trouble him that deſires not to trouble me.

To the firſt I anſwer, That though the Letter was once a

Private one, yet I ſaw it not till it became a Publick, till they were Letters Patents for any bodies reading. And for the other, though it be reaſon not to trouble them that do not trouble us in ſome caſes, as if Mr. *Hobbs* had vented his new Speculations upon making Faces and Diſtortions, turning and toſſing the poor Figures up and down, and then gueſſing at ſome Reaſons of them, which he merrily calls his Opticks; I ſay, if Mr. *Hobbs* had ſpent his Time and Philoſophy upon theſe onely, he had onely diſturbed the Commonwealth of Images and Repreſentations, which are nothing, and therefore ought not to have

have been disturbed by any in those his pleasant Speculations. But when (against mine and every bodies Interest) he labours to introduce a Necessity into all mens Actions, that they have no power to do more or less than they do, he takes away the nature of Vertues and Vices, and so their relation to Reward and Punishment; and by consequence leaves no place for Hope or Fear: which must needs shake not onely the Foundation of all Religion, but even of Human Society. It is such a pernicious piece of Philosophy, as a Wise man would not, and a Fool should not be suffered to vent; fitter in-

deed for a Beadle's, than a Scholar's, Whip; and to him I leave him.

I, Lictor, colliga manus.

FINIS.

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